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Abstract
This paper investigates productivity improving merger activities between a public firm and a
private firm in mixed oligopoly. We assume that the merged firm has two plants (formerly,
firms). We show that both owners of a public firm and a private firm want to merge by
coordinating their shareholding ratios in the merged firm, whenever the number of private
firms is larger than a critical value, while the public firm does not want to merge without the
effect of improving the productivity of the merged firm.
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The literature on horizontal mergers is roughly divided into two categories. The ﬁrst deals with
the proﬁt eﬀects of mergers. Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985) examine
whether mergers are beneﬁcial with regard to the proﬁts of the participants in a quantity and
price setting game, respectively. The second category deals with the welfare eﬀects of mergers.
In particular, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) indicate that mergers may have welfare-improving
eﬀects by redistributing production from less eﬃcient to more eﬃcient ﬁrms.
Except for B´ arcena-Ruiz and Garz´ on (2003), there exist few studies on the decision to merge
by public and private ﬁrms in a mixed oligopoly. They explore the case in which a public
and a private ﬁrm merge into a multiproduct ﬁrm and show that both ﬁrms want to merge
when the shareholding ratio of the owner of the public ﬁrm takes an intermediate value and the
substitutability of the goods produced by both the public and private ﬁrms is suﬃciently low.
In contrast, they ignore the case where mergers improve production eﬃciency. Several reasons
exist why mergers may lead to an improvement of productivity. One is the learning eﬀect, in
which a partner to the merger learns from the other partner’s patents, management expertise, etc.
Despite assuming that there are economies of scale,1 B´ arcena-Ruiz and Garz´ on (2003) disregard
this improvement of productivity. However, if ﬁrms combine some form of “capital” between
their facilities after a merger, it certainly results in improving productivity of the merged ﬁrm
when economies of scale exist. There are no existing studies on productivity-improving mergers
in the context of a mixed oligopoly. This study aims to ﬁll this gap and have an impact on
the subject. For this purpose, we investigate the productivity-improving merger as considered
in McAfee and Williams (1992) under the assumption that ﬁrms have identical technologies
represented by the quadratic cost function.
In our model, there exist one public ﬁrm and n identical private ﬁrms in a homogeneous
goods market; this is in contrast to B´ arcena-Ruiz and Garz´ on (2003), who explore a mixed
duopoly in a diﬀerentiated goods market. We show that if a merger improves productivity, both
a public and a private ﬁrm want to merge when the shareholding ratio of the owner of the public
ﬁrm takes an intermediate value after the merger, even though there exist only a few private
ﬁrms in the market. In addition, we ﬁnd that if the number of private ﬁrms is suﬃciently large,
the owner of the public ﬁrm is always willing to merge whenever its shareholding ratio in the
merged ﬁrm is lower than a critical value.
One example in the real world as our subject of research is presented by European automobile
industry. In particularly, the German public ﬁrm Volkswagen acquired the Spanish ﬁrm SEAT
in 1986. Similarly, Renault, which was privatized in 1986, owned parts of equities in both Nissan
Motor and Nissan Diesel in 1999.
This paper has four sections and an appendix. Section 2 sets up the model. We refer to
McAfee and Williams (1992) for the cost function of the merged ﬁrm.2 In Section 3, we explore
the problem of a merger between a public ﬁrm and a single private ﬁrm. Our purpose here is to
analyze whether the public and the private ﬁrm want to merge, when the merger has an eﬀect
1They assume that ﬁrms have identical technologies represented by the quadratic cost function.
2They assume that the cost of ﬁrm i (i = 1;:::;n) is equal to (qi)
2=2ki, where ki is the ﬁrm’s capital stock.
In addition, we assume that the capital stock of each ﬁrm is normalized to 1, i.e., k0 = k1 = ¢¢¢ = kn = 1.
1of productivity improvement. Section 4 provides the conclusion. In Appendix, we investigate in
detail the case of a merger without any improvement in productivity.
2 The model
We consider a mixed market in which (n + 1) ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good. One of the
ﬁrms is a welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm (denoted by ﬁrm 0), and the others are symmetric
proﬁt-maximizing private ﬁrms (denoted by ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 2, ¢¢¢, and ﬁrm n). We assume the
following linear inverse demand function:
P(Q) = a ¡ Q a > 0;
where Q is the total output of the good. Each ﬁrm produces the good using identical technology,
and the cost function of ﬁrm i is given by
Ci(qi) = (qi)2 i = 0;1;:::;n;
where qi (i = 0;1;:::;n) is the output of each ﬁrm. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is expressed as
¼i = P(Q) ¡ Ci(qi) = (a ¡ Q)qi ¡ (qi)2 i = 0;1;:::;n: (1)
Each private ﬁrm chooses its output level in order to maximize (1). On the other hand, the
public ﬁrm chooses its output to maximize social welfare. Social welfare is represented by the
sum of consumer surplus (denoted by CS) and proﬁts of all ﬁrms as follows:











We assume that the public ﬁrm and one of the private ﬁrms decide whether to merge and set
up a multiplant ﬁrm whose ownership is shared by the owners of the public and private ﬁrms.
For simplicity, we describe the owner of the public ﬁrm after the merger as the public sector and
the owner of the private ﬁrm as the private sector. Since the private ﬁrms are symmetric, we
assume that ﬁrm 1 can merge with the public ﬁrm without loss of generality. We consider that
the merged ﬁrm (denoted by ﬁrm m) has two plants, one of which is owned by the public ﬁrm
and the other by the private ﬁrm before the merger. Thus, the merged ﬁrm can produce the





where qm is the output of the merged ﬁrm. The proﬁt of the ﬁrm is expressed as




3The merged ﬁrm may be regarded as a multiplant ﬁrm, operating the two former ﬁrms as “plants.” In this
paper, we assume that a multiplant merged ﬁrm operates under a situation in which both plants perform most
eﬃciently (see McAfee and Williams, 1992). We assume that the productivity of the public and private ﬁrms is
symmetric, i.e., the cost function of each ﬁrm is represented by the quadratic form of its own output. Therefore,
a merged ﬁrm has technology that is twice as eﬃcient as that of the two pre-merger ﬁrms.
2Note that the total number of ﬁrms is reduced from (n + 1) to n by the merger.
The public and private sectors share the ownership of the merged ﬁrm. Let ® 2 [0;1] denote
the shareholding ratio of the public sector and let the merged ﬁrm choose its output qm to
maximize the weighted average of social welfare and its own proﬁt as in Matsumura (1998).
This objective function is given by
V = ®W + (1 ¡ ®)¼m: (3)
Since the total number of the ﬁrms is reduced by the merger, social welfare is as follows:




The proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm is distributed according to the shareholding ratio. Thus, we
assume that the private sector receives proﬁt at the rate of (1 ¡ ®).
Assumption 1. The payoﬀ of the private sector that partially owns the merged ﬁrm is (1¡®)¼m.
When social welfare improves and the proﬁt received by the private sector increases as the result
of the merger, the public and the private ﬁrm merge.
We consider a two-stage game: In the ﬁrst stage, both the public and the private ﬁrm decide
whether to merge. In the second stage, all ﬁrms choose their own output levels.
3 The decision by ﬁrms to merge
We consider the following two cases: First, the ﬁrms do not merge, resulting in the competition
between one public and n private ﬁrms. We denote this case as N (No merger). Second, the
ﬁrms merge; this case is denoted as M (Merger).
We ﬁrst examine the second stage of the game in case N. As stated in the previous section,
the public ﬁrm chooses q0 to maximize (2), while the private ﬁrm j chooses qj to maximize
(1) (j = 1;:::;n). Solving these maximization problems simultaneously, we obtain the Nash


















2(9 + 2n)2 ; WN =
a2(27 + 28n + 4n2)
2(9 + 2n)2 ; j = 1;:::;n:
The output of the public ﬁrm is larger than that of each private ﬁrm regardless of the number
of private ﬁrms, n. Consumer surplus and social welfare are increasing functions of n, while the
proﬁt of each ﬁrm is a decreasing function of n.
When the public ﬁrm (ﬁrm 0) and the private ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1) merge, they set up a multiplant
ﬁrm that chooses qm to maximize (3). The other ﬁrms choose their output level to maximize













[7 + 2n ¡ ®(2 + n)]2; ¼M
m =
9a2(3 ¡ 2®)
[7 + 2n ¡ ®(2 + n)]2;
CSM =
a2[1 + 2n ¡ ®(n ¡ 1)]2
2[7 + 2n ¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ;
WM =
a2(2 ¡ ®)(6 + 10n + 2n2 + 3® ¡ 2n® ¡ n2®)
2[7 + 2n ¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ; k = 2;:::;n:
The output of the merged ﬁrm is larger than that of each private ﬁrm irrespective of n and
®. In addition, consumer surplus and social welfare are increasing functions of n, while social
welfare decreases as ® increases when the value of ® is suﬃciently high.4 The rise of ® widens
the output gap between each private ﬁrm and the merged ﬁrm. Although the productivity-
improving merger enhances social welfare within the bounds of low ®, the widening gap reduces
social welfare because of the convexity of the cost function when ® is suﬃciently high. In
addition, when the market is a monopoly after the merger (n = 1), social welfare is maximized
at ® = 1.
Next, we analyze both the public and private ﬁrm’s incentives to merge in the ﬁrst stage
of the game. In order to explain these incentives, we employ two eﬀects: share eﬀect and
competition eﬀect. The share eﬀect, which is represented by ®, aﬀects the ﬁrms in case M
through the weight of social welfare in objective function of the merged ﬁrm (see B´ arcena-Ruiz
and Garz´ on, 2003). The competition eﬀect, which is represented by n, aﬀects them in both
cases N and M. When parameter n increases, for a given of parameter ®, consumer surplus and
social welfare increase, while proﬁts of all the ﬁrms decrease.
First, we examine whether the public ﬁrm wishes to merge with the private ﬁrm. Since the
public ﬁrm aims at maximizing social welfare, it has an incentive to merge if WM > WN. Let
®¤
0 and ®¤¤
0 denote the values of ® such that WM = WN:
®¤
0 =
378 + 122n + 4n2 + 3(9 + 2n)
p
27 ¡ 2n + 2n2
351 + 166n + 14n2 ;
®¤¤
0 =
378 + 122n + 4n2 ¡ 3(9 + 2n)
p
27 ¡ 2n + 2n2
351 + 166n + 14n2 :
We obtain the following proposition using ®¤
0 and ®¤¤
0 .
Proposition 1. WM > WN if and only if ®¤¤
0 < ® < ®¤
0.
Proof. Subtracting WN from WM, we obtain the following equation:
WM ¡ WN =
¡a2[(351 + 166n + 14n2)®2 ¡ (756 + 244n + 8n2)® + 351 + 76n ¡ 4n2]
2(9 + 2n)2[7 + 2n ¡ ®(2 + n)]2 :
The sign of RHS depends on that of its numerator. Since this numerator is a quadratic concave
function of ® and is equal to zero when ® = ®¤
0 or ® = ®¤¤
0 , WM > WN if and only if
®¤¤
0 < ® < ®¤
0.
This proposition shows that if the number of private ﬁrms is greater than or equal to 6
(n ¸ 6), the public ﬁrm does not want to merge at ® = 1, since ®¤











7+2n is a decreasing
function of n.
4®






public ﬁrm wants to merge
0
ˆ n
Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 1
decreasing function of n. In addition, when the number is greater than or equal to 23 (n ¸ 23),
the public ﬁrm wants to merge at ® = 0, because ®¤¤
0 jn = 23 < 0 and ®¤¤
0 is a decreasing function
of n. In other words, even if the public sector does not have a share of the merged ﬁrm, the public
ﬁrm has an incentive to merge in n ¸ 23. Figure 1 illustrates this incentive in relation with
parameters n and ®. The shaded area represents the range in which the public ﬁrm wants to
merge. This range broadens as n increases until n = ˆ n, but when n > ˆ n, it narrows conversely.5
The increase in the number of private ﬁrms reduces the public ﬁrm’s contribution to consumer
surplus, but the output gap between the public and private ﬁrms remains. Since the gap
decreases social welfare, the increase enhances the public ﬁrm’s incentive to merge. Thus,
the shaded area widens as n increases. This logic coincides with that of De Fraja and Delbono
(1989), who show that the privatization of a public ﬁrm can improve social welfare.
However, Proposition 1 depends heavily on our assumption that the merger improves the
productivity of the ﬁrm. If we do not assume this eﬀect, the public ﬁrm will not wish to merge
with the private ﬁrm regardless of the number of private ﬁrms (see Appendix).
Next, we consider whether the private ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1) decides to merge with the public ﬁrm.
By Assumption 1, the private ﬁrm decides to merge if (1 ¡®)¼M
m > ¼N
1 . Let ®¤
1 and ®¤¤
1 denote





3197 + 1268n + 116n2 + 3(9 + 2n)
p
3289 + 1156n + 100n2




3197 + 1268n + 116n2 ¡ 3(9 + 2n)
p
3289 + 1156n + 100n2
2(1394 + 584n + 56n2)
:
We obtain the following proposition using these equations.
Proposition 2. (1 ¡ ®)¼M
m > ¼N
1 if and only if ® < ®¤¤
1 .
Proof. Subtracting ¼N
1 from (1 ¡ ®)¼M




a2[(1394 + 584n + 56n2)®2 ¡ (3197 + 1268n + 116n2)® + 1403 + 524n + 44n2]
2(9 + 2n)2[7 + 2n ¡ ®(2 + n)]2 :










private ﬁrm wants to merge
Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 2
The sign of RHS depends on that of its numerator. Since this numerator is a quadratic convex
function of ® and is equal to zero when ® = ®¤
1 or ® = ®¤¤
1 , (1 ¡ ®)¼M
m > ¼N
1 if ® > ®¤
1 or
® < ®¤¤
1 . However, ®¤
1 > 1 for all n, and thus the constraint of ® 2 [0;1] is violated. Therefore,
(1 ¡ ®)¼M
m > ¼N
1 if and only if ® < ®¤¤
1 .
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2. Since the increase in the number of private ﬁrms
reduces the market price and the increment of proﬁt by the merger, the private ﬁrm demands a
higher proﬁt distribution ratio to compensate the proﬁt reduction. Therefore, ®¤¤
1 is a decreasing
function of n (in other words, (1¡®¤¤
1 ) is an increasing function of n). Note that limn!1 ®¤¤
1 =
1=2; thus, the private ﬁrm always decides to merge irrespective of n when the shareholding ratio
of the private sector is more than 1=2.




whether the public and private ﬁrms merge.
Lemma 1. ®¤
0 > ®¤¤
1 for n 2 [1;1) and ®¤¤
0 > ®¤¤
1 at n = 1, but there exists ˜ n 2 (1;1) such
that ®¤¤
1 ¸ ®¤¤
0 for n ¸ ˜ n.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the number of private ﬁrms is suﬃciently small, ®¤¤
0 is greater than ®¤¤
1 . However,
when the number exceeds the critical value ˜ n, this relation is reversed (®¤¤
1 ¸ ®¤¤
0 ). We obtain
an approximate value of n such that ®¤¤
0 = ®¤¤
1 is 1.9907, i.e., the ﬁrms do not merge in mixed
“duopoly.” This coincides with the result of B´ arcena-Ruiz and Garz´ on (2003).6 By Propositions
1 and 2 and Lemma 1,7 we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The public ﬁrm 0 and the private ﬁrm 1 will merge when ®¤¤
0 < ® < ®¤¤
1 .
6B´ arcena-Ruiz and Garz´ on (2003) do not consider the productivity-improving merger. However, even if the
merger improves the productivity of the merged ﬁrm, the ﬁrms do not merge in a mixed duopoly with a homo-
geneous good.















both ﬁrms want to merge
ˆ n
Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 3
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 3. If n 2 (˜ n; ˆ n), the area in which both the public and private
ﬁrm want to merge broadens as n increases.8 In addition, when n is larger than ˆ n, both ﬁrms
want to merge even if the merged ﬁrm is owned only by the private sector (viz., ® = 0). This
is because the welfare loss due to the excess production of the public ﬁrm is larger than the
welfare improvement as a result of increasing consumer surplus as stated above.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows: The shareholding ratio is important for
both the public and private sector of the merged ﬁrm because it directly aﬀects the behavior of
the ﬁrm. Thus, when parameter n is suﬃciently small, the merger is not achieved around ® = 0,
and around ® = 1, either. However, since an increase of n decreases q0=Q and thus reduces the
impact of the public ﬁrm on social welfare, the share eﬀect decreases as n increases (interaction
between the share eﬀect and the competition eﬀect). In addition to this, the existence of more
eﬃcient ﬁrm reduces total output cost. Therefore, the share eﬀect for the public sector decreases
with n and ®¤¤
0 is severely reduced by increase of n. On the other hand, the share eﬀect for the
private sector is not aﬀected by the competition eﬀect so much because the payoﬀ of the private
sector, (1 ¡ ®)¼M, is directly aﬀected by the shareholding ratio. Thus, the share eﬀect has a
more crucial eﬀect on the decision of the private sector than that of the public sector and ®¤¤
1
is almost stable against an increase of n. Accordingly, the area in which both the public and
private ﬁrms want to merge expands with the number of private ﬁrms.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigated how a public and private ﬁrm’s decision whether to merge depends on
the shareholding ratio and the number of private ﬁrms. We showed that when the shareholding
ratio of the public sector is ® 2 (®¤¤
0 ;®¤¤
1 ), which is achieved in n > ˜ n, both ﬁrms decide to
merge. Note that, in a mixed duopoly, the merger is not achieved.
B´ arcena-Ruiz and Garz´ on (2003) demonstrate that the ﬁrms do not merge in a mixed duopoly
with a homogeneous good. However, we proved that if mergers improve the eﬃciency of the
ﬁrms and the number of private ﬁrms is suﬃciently large, the result is not necessarily the same
8However, in n ¸ ˆ n, ®
¤¤
0 is less than 0, and the area narrows as n increases by the constraint of ® ¸ 0.
7as theirs. In particular, the productivity-improving merger is critical to the result. If we do not
assume this eﬀect, the public ﬁrm does not choose to merge regardless of the number of private
ﬁrms.
We assumed that each ﬁrm produces a homogeneous good using identical technology. We
also brieﬂy mention here the case of asymmetric technologies, in particular that of a public ﬁrm
less eﬃcient than a private ﬁrm. In this case, the public ﬁrm is even more willing to merge since
it beneﬁts from the higher productivity of the private ﬁrm. Thus, in the case that both ﬁrm’s
cost functions are asymmetric, a curve corresponding to ®¤¤
0 in Figure 1 and 3 is more rapidly
decreasing with n around 1. On the other hand, the private ﬁrm is reluctant to merge with the
public ﬁrm, since the productivity improvement rate is lower than in the case where the ﬁrms
have identical technologies. Thus, a curve corresponding to ®¤¤
1 in Figure 2 and 3 shifts down
below. Therefore, when a public ﬁrm is less eﬃcient than a private ﬁrm, it is ambiguous whether
the area in which both the public and private ﬁrms want to merge expands or not compared to
the case where their cost functions are symmetric. However, the area still exists in (n;®)-plane.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on mixed oligopoly by showing that a public ﬁrm
may have an incentive to merge with a private ﬁrm in a homogeneous goods market. However,
two interesting extensions of our model still remain. One is the situation in which the public
ﬁrm merges with multiple private ﬁrms, and another is where there exist foreign shareholders
of the private ﬁrms. Since it would appear that these situations would have an impact on the
ﬁrms’ decision to merge, the investigation of these situations is important for future studies of
mergers in mixed markets.
Appendix
The public ﬁrm’s decision without productivity improvement
We show that the public ﬁrm does not have an incentive to merge with the private ﬁrm in the
case where the merger does not improve the productivity of the merged ﬁrm. In this case, social
welfare before and after the merger is as follows:
WN =
a2(27 + 28n + 4n2)
2(9 + 2n)2 ;
WM =
a2[36n + 9n2 + (6 ¡ 18n ¡ 6n2)® ¡ (3 ¡ 2n ¡ n2)®2]
2[9 + 3n ¡ (2 + n)®]2 :
Subtracting WN from WM, we examine the public ﬁrm’s incentive to merge with the private
ﬁrm.
WM ¡ WN =
¡a2[(351 + 166n + 14n2)®2 ¡ (1458 + 576n + 36n2)® + 2187 + 810n + 54n2]
2(9 + 2n)2[9 + 3n ¡ (2 + n)®]2 :
The sign of RHS depends on that of its numerator. This numerator is a quadratic concave
function of ® and the discriminant of this quadratic equation, D, is9
D = ¡432(9 + 2n)2(27 + 14n + n2) < 0:
Thus, for all n, WN is larger than WM and the public ﬁrm does not want to merge.
9a
2 is omitted for simplicity.
8Proof of Lemma 1
We divide this proof into three steps.
First, we prove that ®¤
0 > ®¤¤
1 for n 2 [1;1). Evaluating ®¤
0 and ®¤¤
1 at n = 1, then
®¤











1 jn = 1:









¼ 0:8918 > ®¤¤
1 jn = 1:
Since, in addition to this, ®¤
0 and ®¤¤




Second, we prove that ®¤¤
0 > ®¤¤
1 at n = 1. Evaluating ®¤¤
0 at n = 1, we obtain
®¤¤







0 jn = 1 > ®¤¤
1 jn = 1.
Finally, we prove that there exists ˜ n 2 (1;1) such that ®¤¤
1 ¸ ®¤¤
0 for n ¸ ˜ n. As mentioned
in Section 3, both ®¤¤
0 and ®¤¤















0 jn = 1 > ®¤¤
1 jn = 1, there exists ˜ n > 1 such that ®¤¤
1 ¸ ®¤¤
0 for n ¸ ˜ n.
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